What Does Russia Have to Do With Syria
5 years into Russian federation's war machine intervention in Syria, agreement Moscow's endgame could provide critical insights into the decade-long conflict'southward trajectory, equally well every bit Russia'southward posture in the Eye East and across. Although notwithstanding evolving and subject to internal debates, Moscow's Syria strategy appears to be centered on a "spheres of influence" model. In this model, Syria is divided into distinct realms under the sway of competing external patrons. This arroyo accepts a circuitous interplay of war machine, political, and economical power between external actors Russia, Turkey, the United States, and Islamic republic of iran within the dynamic Syrian context. While this model seeks to maximize Russia'southward advantages and provide some stability in a volatile conflict scenario, its success remains a longshot with challenges from the U.s.a., domestic Russian constraints, regional dynamics, and the complex Syrian context.
Nevertheless, this "spheres of influence" model points to i potential outcome of the Syrian conflict and more than significantly illuminates a potential Russian arroyo for both the region and, what some Russian strategists' term, a "mail service-West" order. This lodge centers on a multipolar, competitive world characterized by a diminished role of the Usa and an elevated Russian condition. Thus, understanding Russia's endgame in Syria may unlock insights into Moscow's strategic posture in a circuitous 21st century globe, with important implications for the United States. This analysis was based on numerous encounters with Russian experts in dialogues held by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), and other institutions from 2018-2021. The analysis and conclusions that follow stem from the many discussions that occurred over more than than two years and are solely those of the author. This newspaper does not correspond the views of the GCSP or the U.S. Institute of Peace where the author is a senior counselor.
Groundwork and Strategic Framing
Past most accounts, Moscow's 2015 decision to intervene militarily in Syria turned the tide of the war in favor of the Assad regime. Russian airpower combined with Iranian-backed militias on the footing played a decisive role in preventing the Assad government's plummet past neutralizing a large segment of armed opposition and brutally reasserting authorities command over much of Syria.
Every bit of early 2021, the conflict appears to exist inbound a period of stalemate marked past more static conflict lines. However, the conflict is not entirely "frozen" as Syria remains inherently volatile. Some areas—notably Idlib and parts of northeast Syria—still hold the potential for major contestation. Yet, virtually regions will non be subject to large-scale military offensives, shifting frontlines, or massive displacement.
Russia'south motivations, goals, and strategy are increasingly discernible against this backdrop of a "stable-unstable" Syrian arab republic. Having achieved its master objective of rescuing the authorities and bolstering its grip on power, Russian federation at present appears focused on developing its endgame strategy.
Specifically, Russian federation's endgame in Syria seeks to promote Moscow's interests in iii concentric arenas: (1) Syria'southward multi-layered disharmonize; (ii) Russia'south role in regional/Middle Due east dynamics; and (3) Moscow'due south broader conception of an evolving global order. These elements are loosely inter-connected. Russia's ascendant posture in Syria serves as a platform for its engagement across the Middle East, while also advancing a worldview that seeks to further erode the U.S.-led, rules-based international order.
Russian federation's endgame strategy is withal somewhat inchoate. Several factors—some potentially insurmountable—inhibit Moscow's power to develop a coherent and sustainable vision that translates its military gains into a political settlement favorable to Russian federation and the Assad regime. These factors include: divisions within Russia'due south national security apparatus (especially between the ministries of defense and foreign affairs); strong international opposition to the Assad authorities; the Syrian conflict's complication including its many strange stakeholders; and major constraints on Russia'due south power projection and ability to shape Syria's conflict dynamics.
Largely pragmatic and opportunistic, Russia's Syria endgame nonetheless contains elements of a broader "k strategy." For Russia, Syrian arab republic'southward strategic importance resonates across the Eye Eastward every bit a test case for Russia'due south desired "mail-W" world. This multipolar, competitive "postal service-West" world features Russian federation'due south elevated status at the expense of diminished U.Southward. power. Nowhere is this vision more apparent for Russia than in the Middle East where Moscow seeks to exploit the perception of a U.S. withdrawal from the region to project its ain influence.
Russia'due south Endgame in Syria: A "Spheres of Influence" Model
Russia's endgame emerges from a position of weakness rather than strength. Cognizant of its limitations in Syria, Russia appears to be constructing a businesslike endgame strategy that implicitly acknowledges Moscow'south many shortfalls in Syria, while exploiting openings to consolidate its military gains. Russia looks to exist settling for an endgame in Syria that stakes its claim on key strategic assets, while ceding power and influence in areas beyond its control. In its ideal, this endgame strategy works in concert with partners with whom Russia tin cooperate, while undermining rivals who threaten Moscow'due south strategy.
Moscow's Syria strategy is informed past the so-called "Primakov Doctrine." As Eugene Rumer asserts in a 2019 paper, "Named afterwards old foreign and prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, the Primakov doctrine posits that a unipolar world dominated by the United states is unacceptable to Russia." The doctrine'southward key elements include the push for a multipolar world with major powers seeking to counterbalance the Usa, and Russian federation playing an essential role in that try. Rumer notes, "The Syrian operation is a perfect instance of the Primakov doctrine in action."
In Syria, Russia's "spheres of influence" model references 19th and 20th century geopolitics, simply besides reflects an updated view that recognizes the limits of Russian ability. It is defined by a malleable approach in Syria where Russian federation shapeshifts depending on the imperatives of unlike subregions in Syria'south circuitous conflict. Leap by Syria'south complex conflict dynamics, Moscow's strategy acquiesces to Syria'southward de facto zones of control that substantially translate into 3 major spheres of influence: Russia in the west, specially along Syria's strategic spine; Turkey in the north; and begrudgingly for Moscow, the United States in the east. Though within this rough schema, several nuances be.
While a consequential player in Syria, Iran does not exert command over a specific territorial sphere of influence, given the more covert nature of its power in Syria. Instead, Iran and its proxies will project influence in strategic areas under government/Russian control. These areas include southern Damascus, pockets in the southwest and the southeast—particularly around the Abu Kamal edge crossing and the Deir Zor countryside, and micro-areas in and around Aleppo and Hama governorates.
Turkey's sphere of influence will be divers past its current zones of control: Euphrates Shield, Afrin, and Peace Spring. The March fifth cease-burn down negotiated with Russia will roughly delineates a fourth zone in northern Idlib governorate stretching north from the M4 highway, although these lines have yet to be solidified.
While the Us is the primary power in eastern Syria, the area remains less stable, characterized past connected power competition with Russia. Though express, Russian influence in the northeast is exercised through its articulation patrols with the Turks in some border areas, cooperation with the Kurdish-led Syrian Autonomous Forces (SDF) in others, and being embedded with the regime in express spaces such as the Qamishli aerodrome. Russian influence is too projected in attempts to encroach on areas where U.S. forces are the ascendant external actor, including effectually Hasakeh and the middle and lower Euphrates valley.
Moscow's "spheres of influence" model adheres to the many constraints Russian federation faces, both in Syria likewise as domestically, necessarily inhibiting its power to projection maximum power. While Moscow professes the importance of restoring Syria'southward total territorial integrity (and the Assad regime demands nothing less), the Russian endgame recognizes that powerful external actors will continue to exert control over important swaths of Syria. Rather than begetting the risks and undertaking the significant investment necessary to oust these foreign powers from Syria, Russian federation instead has developed a synergistic partnership with one—Turkey—while limiting its opposition to provocative probes of the other—the United states.
This is an excerpt from a paper, "Agreement Russian federation'south Endgame in Syrian arab republic: A View from the United States," originally published by the Geneva Eye for Security Policy as office of its Syria Transition Challenges Project.
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Source: https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/02/what-russias-endgame-syria
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